Архив метки ЭТОС НАУКИ

На мосту интерпретаций: Р. Мертон и социальная эпистемология

Порус Владимир Натанович

НИУ Высшая школа экономики, Москва, Россия

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: НАУКА, ПОВЕДЕНИЕ УЧЕНЫХ, ЭТОС НАУКИ, СОЦИОЛОГИЯ НАУКИ, СОЦИАЛЬНАЯ ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ, ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИЯ

АННОТАЦИЯ:
Социологическая концепция “этоса науки” Р. Мертона рассматривается с точки зрения ее социально- эпистемологического содержания. Как “социальная эпистемология”, эта концепция служит одним из источников мифа о “большой науке”, сыгравшего заметную роль в философии науки ХХ века. Критика этой концепции может рассматриваться как спор различных эпистемологических интерпретаций социологических данных о науке и действиях ученых в исследовательских ситуациях.

ОПИСАНИЕ НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ:

On the Bridge of Interpretations: R. Merton and Social Epistemology

Porus Vladimir N.

National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Moscow

In the last century, the relationship between sociology of knowledge and philosophy could have become the plot thread for a narrative about mutual concord and discord. This love story persists in the current century, and the child grown up by that love is social epistemology, which gives rise to a relevant question: how is the latter possible? Or rather, how is this philosophical discipline possible? Sometimes the response to this question is “negative”: they say that it is a “sub-discipline in the sociology of knowledge that presumes that traditional epistemological problems should be solved by sociological methods and means”. What can be opposed to this “negation”? A difficult path would be chosen by those who regard social epistemology as a “post-non-classical theory of cognition”. What is social epistemology needed for? Perhaps its mission is to solve in practice the contradictions that defy a theoretical solution: what is required is not to rack one’s brain over universal epistemological problems, but rather to work on particular case studies and to recount the findings in more precise and clear terms. Social epistemology serves as sort of a bridge between philosophy and specific scientific studies of inquiry; its goal is to attach philosophical meaning to the latter, and to land philosophical reasoning from the heaven of abstraction onto the soil of facts and empirical studies. Difficult questions arise. Firstly, is it clear who might need this bridge? Will there be volunteers among scholars to cross it in the direction of philosophy? Secondly, the bridge is swaying, and both its supports are unstable. One of them is insecure because philosophy is fundamentally pluralistic, the other because particular epistemological disciplines cannot off er any “pure facts” and “empirical generalizations” that are exempt from epistemological interpretations. If the bridge is really needed I would call it the Bridge of Interpretations. It looks like no paper written by philosophers since the 1950s, as far as the ethos of science is concerned, has managed to do without references to R. Merton’s works. They involved basic guidelines for scientists to follow in their activities, as well as the idea that these guidelines make up a set of conditions under which science functions and advances in the “right” way. It is believed that the conclusion about the universal character of the ethos of science and values in science that make its existence possible was made by Merton on the basis of historical and sociological analyses of scientific institutions. If this is true, it is a conclusion made by an epistemological sociologist, and its philosophical meaning can be found through the appropriate interpretations. Some philosophers have liked this concept, others have criticized it, but all of them have tried to find in Merton’s observations and conclusions things that corroborate with their own ideas on science and scientists’ ethics. This interpretation is possible in relation to all norms in Merton’s scientific ethos. But do these norms allow another interpretation? Is it possible that Merton’s theory of the ethos of science could emerge in the form of a different socio-epistemological theory? The Bridge of Interpretations sees a complicated interaction between interpreting and interpreted statements. The philosophical perspective on evidence from sociologists is changeable; if not the data then their selection. A question follows: are the disciplinary norms inferred from sociological studies or are they the outcomes of a certain philosophical interpretation of the latter? The normative ethos of science as presented by Merton was a result of a certain concept of “ideal science.” This served as a “sieve” to identify facts with sociological meaning and then to take into consideration other facts that correspond basically to the chosen concept. Then it should be acknowledged that this concept serves as a scheme to interpret sociological facts, and subsequently the theory of an ethos in science must be assigned to social epistemology. So it follows that criticism from the side of alternative interpretations of scientific development (T. Kuhn, S. Toulmin, J. Agassi, P. Feyerabend and so on) is an argument between philosophical theories rather than attempts to find empirical proofs or refutations. All this is a competition between philosophical interpretations of the development of science. When pursuing a comparison, the argument takes place on an oscillating Bridge which is swinging more intensively due to efforts of the contentious participants. Merton himself, in order to support his interpretive scheme, declared the facts to be proofs of a beahavioral “pathology”, revealing that the real conduct of scientists differs greatly from the “normative” ideal. Later on, Merton’s interpretive scheme came under reproofs: its descriptions and explanations of scientific reality were allegedly wrong. This criticism is sometimes presented as “further development in Mertonian sociology of science” and sometimes as a split with it. These criticisms are obviously directed against Merton’s method of sociological studies, and not against their philosophical interpretation. This criticism of Mertonian theory can be considered typical. Nevertheless, behind this criticism one can discern a confrontation of various epistemologies. When the tension of disagreements dropped, the time of ironical criticism of any normative perceptions of science came. What is the worth of this normative approach if it is so easy to substitute anti-norms for norms that show a frustrating symmetry between positive and negative modalities of scientists’ behavior? During the general functional crisis in science the behavioral norms of scientists in this country persist in a more or less stable condition of survival. They even support the hopes that Russian science will overcome its comatose state. It is quite possible that in this crisis scientists’ disinterestedness will become a principle of the scientific ethos that passes us collectively through a decisive test. After that it would not be so easy to make ironic remarks on the state of science. I will say in conclusion the following and would like to not be misunderstood. Considering the Mertonian sociology of knowledge as one approach in social epistemology, I do not detract from the scientific value of these studies, and I do not disparage the kind of science to which they belong. Quite the contrary: it is because these studies assimilate scientific methodology and data along with philosophical interpretation that they have produced a certain cultural awareness which accompanies the entire history of Mertonian sociology of science. It makes R. Merton’s contribution to science and philosophy, and further on to the present-day culture, so distinguished.

Видный российский мыслитель Михаил Константинович Петров по праву считается одним из основоположников науковедения в нашей стране. Статья, посвященная эволюции воззрений Р. Мертона, была подготовлена им около сорока лет тому назад и никогда не публиковалась. В редакцию работу любезно предоставила Гали Дмитриевна Петрова, являющаяся хранительницей архива М. К. Петрова. С ее согласия мы публикуем статью, которая и сегодня звучит актуально и будет, уверены, интересна современному читателю.

Методологическая эволюция Р.К. Мертона

Петров М.К. (1923–1987)

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: РОБЕРТ К. МЕРТОН, СОЦИОЛОГИЯ НАУКИ, ЭТОС НАУКИ, АКТУАЛИЗМ

АННОТАЦИЯ:
Рассматривается развитие американской социологии науки, связанной, прежде всего, с именем Р. К. Мертона. Анализируется эволюция его теоретических взглядов: в работах конца 1930-х годов Мертон остается еще способным учеником Сорокина и Парсонса, ограничивая меру своей теоретической самостоятельности “внешней социологией” науки. В работах 1960-х и начала 1970-х годов Мертон эзотеричен, занят научной деятельностью как таковой, придерживаясь рамок сформулированного им в 1961 году для собственного употребления поведенческого постулата, восходящего к Бэкону.

ОПИСАНИЕ НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ:

The Methodological Evolution of R. K. Merton

Petrov Mikhail K. (1923–1987)

During his forty years of active participation in shaping sociology of science as a separate scientific discipline, Merton walked a long and not always straight road. In his late 1930s works he still remained an able follower of Sorokin and Parsons. In the 1960s to 1970s, Merton studied scientific activity as such. His general shift of interest from the historical problem of science as an institution to the problem of functioning forms of scientific activity was accompanied by what are called ‘actualist’ tendencies. Actualism is understood as – common for all experimental sciences — a proceduralcognitive-postulate complex based on the united principles of observation and verification. An explanation of a phenomena observed, if it is to be considered scientific, must be limited to or by the observation of causes. Within actualism, it is impossible to express knowledge of phenomena or objects the essential feature of which are marks of singularity, uniqueness, or space and time. The growing actualist trends point to constant efforts to reconstruct the subject matter of sociology of science in order to find in it invariant universal units and structures that belong to the disciplines so-called “eternity”. The book “Sociology of Science,” with Merton’s 22 papers, enables us to thoroughly follow Merton’s transformation. The mid-1950s saw growing disagreements with Sorokin and later with Parsons. Merton more and more often tried to find in F. Bacon basic analogies, subject-methodological postulates, and ideas of what sociology of science should be as a scientific discipline. The Bacon of 1961 in Merton hardly resembled his 1938 Bacon. If earlier on he was a scholar dreaming of the almighty scientific method, later on he became a distinguished sociologist who managed to say everything about sociology of science. The 1961 Bacon formulated four basic requirements for scientific disciplines and for the disciplinary form of cognition in general: a) incremental accumulation of knowledge; b) continuous social interaction between scientists; c) methodological use of research procedures; d) all social and scientific innovations are “conditioned by time”. It is clear that it is not about the theory formulated by Bacon himself, but about Merton’s “guesswork”. Bacon is readily taken out of the 1615 context by Merton, which is why he is such an amenable staff in Merton’s hands. Merton got the idea that scientific disciplines progress unevenly, and that disciplines, with physics at their head as the “most developed”, built a hierarchical structure in a certain distinctive scientific time. Scientific work according to the rules of natural sciences (observability, experimental verification, incremental accumulation, puzzle solving, prohibition of repeating the results) suggests a quite certain “natural” structure of a discipline, as well as a certain cognitive position of a scientist. Merton’s shuttle movements, his constant journeys from modernity to the XVII century and from the XVII century to modernity are not so innocuous. In the 1960s Merton paid much attention to the issues of pathological science (multiple discoveries, priority quarrels, the paradoxes of recognition and reward system) and the attendant problem of the ambivalence of scientists’ motivation. These subsequently replaced the historical component that was seen in Merton’s early works. Sociology of science — as shaped by Merton — saw substitution of the historical with the extra-historical, static or “eternal”. Confined to ambivalence — motivation, contributions, judgments, recognition, scientific careers — the subject matter of sociology of science acquires a typical “dissociated” structure with its highest unit — a scientist’s career. Other components of the subject matter in sociology of science subsequently lose their substance, for example, scientists’ training (reproduction of scientific agents) and institutions for utilizing scientific knowledge (transfer of knowledge to places and dates of application). In seeking disciplinary perfection, the Mertonian “1960s paradigm” ignores the practical use of scientific findings. The “1960s paradigm” brings the biggest distortions into the structure of scientific activity, its research and academic aspects. Merton assigns four roles to scientists: researcher, teacher, administrator, gatekeeper. The roles are presented as relatively independent forms of activity. The role of a teacher — treated as an “honorary retreat” for scientists who have left research – sustains the biggest damage. The reason for this dissociation of the scientist’s role may be again found in the “1960s paradigm” that concentrates researchers’ attention on the scientific career and its main defining factor, which means accumulating personal contributions (though it ignores the fact that contributions are of different types). Merton’s “1960s paradigm”, though a very significant effort, does not constitute the entire sociology of science (be it even only American), but rather a specific and in a certain sense (actualism) dead-end research approach in the sociology of science. The “1960s paradigm” finds its clearest conceptual contradiction in the notions of citation-rewarding that were suggested for the first time by Price, as well as in Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. Merton considered Kuhn’s scientific revolutions to be on the periphery of the subject matter of sociology of science. The “1960s paradigm” cannot be deemed complete or in any sense final for all sociologists of science. It left outside of its analysis quite essential ties and indicators of disciplinary efforts. Neglecting them can hardly allow a scholar to off er a causal description of the phenomena that are materialized in Merton’s paradigm. The general actualist sense of the “1960s paradigm” and its orientation to extra-temporal universals does not allow researchers who use this paradigm to go beyond description of the facts from scientific work. Instead, it calls into question the possibility of applying such knowledge to solving practical problems.

Создание Р. Мертоном классических парадигм социологии науки: взгляд из XXI века

Мотрошилова Неля Васильвена

Учреждение Российской академии наук Института философии РАН, Москва, Россия

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: РОБЕРТ МЕРТОН, НАУКА, СОЦИОЛОГИЯ НАУКИ, НАУЧНАЯ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ, ЭТОС НАУКИ, НОРМЫ, АНТИНОРМЫ

АННОТАЦИЯ: Статья является предпубликацией из новой книги. Презентируются идеи классической социологии науки, которые неразрывно связаны с творчеством выдающегося социолога XX столетия Роберта Мертона (1910-2003). Оценивается вклад Р. Мертона и его ближайших коллег в теоретическую культуру прошлого столетия, в научное и практическое понимание социального смысла науки.

ОПИСАНИЕ НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ:

Robert Mertons Formulation of the Classical Paradigms in the Sociology of Science: Looking Back from the 21st Century

Motroshilova Nelya V.

Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

This text is an advance publication related to the book “Russian philosophy in the 1950s–1980s and Western thought”. One of its parts concerns the fact that western sociology of science was assimilated in Russia by philosophers, some of whom later on began to work professionally in the sociology of science. The other scholars were those who remained in philosophy, writing papers on the philosophy of science, science studies, theory of knowledge and history of philosophy at the same time. These authors tried also to understand the practical side of sociology of science and knowledge. I belong to the second group of scholars. As early as the 1970s, I was familiar with some of R. Merton’s works that were available in our country. It was a big event for me to meet Robert Merton and Harriet Zuckerman at the 1972 congress of sociology in Bulgaria1 . Soon, Merton, on learning about my scientific pursuits, sent me his main publications on sociology of science with his good words written on them for me. I keep them as a treasure. I used them in my book “Science and scientists in conditions of modern capitalism” (1976) («Наука и ученые в условиях современного капитализма» (М. : Наука, 1976), which includes references for more than 300 sources. It has a section on Merton’s sociology of science. In the XXI century, again I have returned to summing up my experience in sociology of science and the results of the discipline’s development that has lasted for many years. I was also motivated to do this by the attempts of some scholars at the end of the XX century to get rid of the main concepts of sociology of science. The latter, of course, were associated with R. Merton and his followers. This is why the question stands high on the agenda of where Merton and his disciples were a success and where they failed. In the light of these research tasks I think it necessary to look carefully, given the XXI century perspectives and requirements, at the results of the scientific path paved by Merton and his followers. The present paper is devoted to this general goal.

A concise summary of R. Merton and his school’s contribution to the creation and development of sociology of science

Sociology of science as a distinctive sociological discipline came to model a classically developed, paradigmatic, comprehensive, well founded, self-critical, and constantly growing discipline, rather conceptual at the beginning, and later on involving the entire masses of concrete research. 1. Analyses have suggested the historical causes of Merton’s early works on the sociology of science and knowledge. Of particular importance were the responses given by democratic sociologists in protest against the National Socialism coming to power in Germany, the rise of fascism in other European countries, the racist ideology and suppression of science, and the persecution of scientists. 2. The social and historical conditions were used to explain why and how R. Merton started to explore scientific norms. A detailed analysis of scientific norms was conducted that did not agree with the opinions that Merton had worked out with regard to them being “too ideal,” and subsequently disconnected from real science. Actually, the situation, both historical and theoretical, was largely different. First, as early as the 1930–1940s, sociology of science made its first and quite successful steps. The concept of scientific norms was roughly formulated in the first works of the 1940s. Second, difficulties, contradictions and deficiencies in Merton’s original theory were best seen by the author himself and his close followers. So the most successful corrections to the concept of scientific norms were contributed by Merton and his group. Third, it would be wrong to say that the early Merton suggested only ideal, pure, bright scientific norms, and only later, under the influence of criticism from outside, did he pay attention to real scientific norms. As a matter of fact, his statements include: a) an ideal aspect that is normative and imperative; a1 ) an objective-orientated, argumentative aspect: what should be done and what a scientist does by all means because he or she achieves objective knowledge; b) warning statements that suggest what should not be done in science and why, and also what happens in real scientific environments and how scientists’ behave can be seldom observed in the ideal form. 3. What is important: when Merton identified, in a “pure form”, prescriptions, i.e. aspects of research activity “as they should be”, he presumed that the institution of science interiorizes norms in scientists due to their inherent need to fulfill the main function of science — acquiring verifiable, corroborative, that is, “genuine” knowledge. He was absolutely right in this and did it in a Kantian manner. Like Kant, Merton shaped scientific norms as a sum of requirements for what is necessary, as things should be (both for science and society). He demonstrated that an implementation of norms in real, everyday scientific practice must involve specific, pluralistic and contradictory features. And this was the second move, after the normative one, toward a system of research steps that related to general studies of scientific norms. These steps were also made by Merton and his school in the 1950s–1970s. 4. I consider the high theoretical level that is also a feature of Merton’s concrete and empirical research to be a proof and illustration of the “classical”, paradigmatic nature. 5. The following was demonstrated in the course of analysing terminological and other corrections and additions to the theory of norms that were done within Merton’s school: additions were not useless; though terminological corrections and system additions (CUDOS+) did not actually settle down in the end. 6. I suppose that claims to substitute Mertonian theory of scientific norms with the concept of anti-norms (R. Boguslav, I. Mitroff , S. Fuller) failed. The arguments are the following: a) complete dependence on a negative anti-concept of Mertonian theory (each anti-norm is just an antipode to a Meronian norm); b) the negative side of the real behavior of scientists had never been unknown to Mertonian teaching; Merton and his followers studied it thoroughly; c) should Mertonian norms be substituted with anti-norms it would be hardly possible to understand how, using them, scholars and their communities could produce objective scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, anti-norm theory has its important meaning — as a warning. 7. Assuming that research conducted by R. Merton and his school helped to work out “classical paradigms” in sociology of science, two questions arise. First, is it worth working on non-classical or post-classical paradigms in such a discipline? Has anybody observed such systematic studies as Merton’s recently? The answer to the first question in the Conclusion to the paper is positive, the second answer is negative. The author suggests some ideas about what theoretical approaches would be reasonable to choose in order to search for non-classical paradigms of sociology of science.

Человек в науке: социологические дискуссии XX века

Мирская Елена Зиновьевна

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: НАУКА, НАУЧНОЕ ЗНАНИЕ, НАУЧНОЕ СООБЩЕСТВО, ПРОФЕССИОНАЛЬНАЯ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ УЧЕНЫХ, ЭТОС НАУКИ, Р. МЕРТОН, НОРМЫ И МОДЕЛИ, ТРАДИЦИИ И НОВАЦИИ

АННОТАЦИЯ: Когда в год столетия со дня рождения Р. К. Мертона в журнале по социологии науки появляется статья “Человек науки”, то естественно, большая часть читателей предполагают, что статья эта о Роберте Кинге Мертоне – о его жизни и научных достижениях. Автор же хочет рассмотреть не одного выдающегося человека, а феномен ученого: как он “делает науку”? в чем его функция в системе науки, в механизме порождения нового знания? Конечно, без обсуждения точки зрения и мнений Р. К. Мертона здесь не обойтись – ведь он первым поставил эти вопросы и дал на них свой вариант ответов. Но все- таки статья будет не о нем, а вообще о человеке науки и его специфической деятельности, точнее – об их моделях.

ОПИСАНИЕ НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ:

A Man in Science: Sociological Discussions in the 20th Century

Mirskaya. Elena Z.

Head, Department of Sociology of Science,
Institute for the History of Science and Technology named after Sergey I. Vavilov,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

When exploring the problem of “a man in science” one can distinguish three stages that involve different approaches which in turn are connected with the dynamics of science itself. The first stage sees an attempt to understand activity in science — scientific creativity, through specific qualities of a creative individual outside of his or her social relations. But with this perspective it is impossible to identify causal links or to answer the question of why a scientist has a particular set of qualities, is interested in specific issues, is guided by distinctive motives, and so on. It looks like in order to understand a man in science one should analyze the relationships that tie people in their activity and the mechanisms that constitute the basis for development in a given fi eld. This perspective characterized the second stage of explorations of a man in science in the 1960s. Robert K. Merton and his school made activities regarding the social institute of science the main subject of their studies. This point of view led to the idea that science advances according to its own laws of motion independently of people who produce this movement by their everyday activity. The evolution of this type of a conception of a man in science resulted in “the loss of man”. Views on science, however, changed dramatically in the 1970s. Kuhn attracted the attention of those who studied science to the fact that in different paradigms scientists see things differently. With this he highlighted the relativity of scientific knowledge. This resulted in the field known as sociology of scientific knowledge, which led to a new understanding of the role of the human subject making a particular scientific inquiry. The Mertonian positivist sociology of science that excluded entirely an agent’s influence from the production of scientific knowledge was criticized sharply by advocates of interpretive sociology that placed the agent of knowledge in the priority. Interpretive sociology ignores structures that exist objectively; it only takes into account scientists who interact as they do science. We could thus say that we have seen a man of science in three mirrors: those of the psychological perspective, normative sociology of science and interpretive sociology of science. The first discipline that started to collect data on the progress of scientific knowledge was the history of science. From that perspective, the advancement of science was related very closely to the actions of particular scientists. The history of science created an image of scientists based on biographies and memoires. So by the beginning of the XX century, a traditional (classical) model of a scientist and his or her actions emerged that did not take into account comprehensive ties with social setting. The transition to “big science” highlighted the problems of scientific work in research teams, and the problem of a man in science came to be explored purely sociologically, and precisely from the perspective of normative sociology. An illusion then emerged that science can be efficient without bright individuals, thanks to good organization, that science is a mere sum of equipment, facilities, money, scientific programs and a set of research institutions where a certain number of scientists work who diff er only in positions and earnings. This view did not consider the activity of a hidden factor in the personality of a scientist, as a creator. Successful work in science needs not only appropriate education, equipment, salary, etc. Rather, a man must also pursue scientific values, his or her own advancement and recognition in science which means to have a scientist’s consciousness. A scientist’s personal research efficiency depends not merely on the level of motivation but on his or her “orientation” toward science. A “pro-scientific” orientation can be reinforced by the public prestige of science, traditional images and expectations (fascination with work, acquisition of new knowledge, deep internal work satisfaction). So, human activity in present-day science seems to be related to traditional patterns of scientific creativity. This “asocial” pattern is a significant part of scientists’ consciousness, which acquires a social meaning. When identifying further the mechanisms governing scientists’ behavior it is important to remember that science is created not as a “sum” of individual scientists’ actions but as a result of their interaction. Since this interrelationship is manifested in a wide range of scientific phenomena it seems promising to look at these issues from the ethos of a scientific point of view, drawing on an analysis of ethical regulators in scientific work. Like other social institutions science has its own code — a set of principles, rules and norms that scientists should follow — that is the scientific ethos that has been formed in the course of human history. Special attention must be paid to analyses of scientific community norms. ‘Norms of science’ — the concept that Robert Merton introduced into the sociology of science — are derivatives of scientific aims and methods: everything that is conducive to developing scientific knowledge is considered a norm. The first one, universalism, establishes scientific knowledge as universally valid irrespective of the place of a discovery and the personal characteristics of its author. The norm of communalism requires that scientists should submit their achievements to public use. The norm of skepticism requires that scientists should constantly pay critical attention to their colleagues’ findings. The norm of disinterestedness leads scientists in a certain direction. The Mertonian concept of the scientific ethos dominated throughout the 1960s. The first objections emerged in the early 1970s. In the most common version of criticism, the opponents, using a set of cases, pointed to the discrepancy between them and the real practice of scientists. But this kind of criticism results from a failure to understand the essence of norms: these norms do not describe mass behavior but its “ideal”. The main deficiency of this concept is that the rules of scientific work do not change in the course of scientific advancement, and they are presented as being immune to changes in social life. But since changes in working conditions lead to changes in human attitudes and values, in reality ethical norms in science are also unavoidably changing. When formulating the norms of the scientific ethos, Merton assumed that the institution of science was an autonomous community of career scientists who were engaged in research in a disinterested manner (on the model of the German university of the XIX century). The “traditional ethos” comes largely close to the “traditional model” of a scientist. New circumstances (the growing role of applied research) make it impossible, however, to observe certain rules for the majority of scientists. The demands for socially-oriented research and ‘humanizing science’ are currently of paramount importance. T. Kuhn advanced a new social-historical understanding of science which later became prevalent in the fi eld, namely, that norms came to be perceived much more widely. First, they were said to govern not only the social but also the substantive behavior of scientists as well; second, norms are not constant, they are subject to changes, so each paradigm has its own distinctive norms. The Kuhnian perspective rejected universal epistemological rationality. Nevertheless, Kuhn continued to think that within the “normal” science, knowledge was produced according to constant rules. This meant that on this point he remained in the normative approach tradition. In this sense, he did not refute, but instead complemented the Mertonian tradition. Ensuing developments of Kuhn’s understanding of the character of scientific knowledge led to the emergence of a radically new theoretical basis for the fi eld. Interpretive sociology of science that had come into existence in the late 1970s — early 1980s, adopted as its basis a form of analysis that lifted altogether the problem of “rules”, “norms” and “working to the rules”. So it was not just the details that this later work rejected in Kuhn, but also the essence of the Mertonian concept, i.e. the norms. The question of how regulative structures in scientific work emerge and their influence on science should be more fully examined in light of the background image of a gradual transition on-going in science to a “postindustrial” form of existence. A radically new quality in the information society leads to an “organic paradigm” that is likely to appear, not in the last instance, in science. At that time much will look absolutely different in the realm of sociology of science than it does now.